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Last June, the U.S. House ofRepresentatives voted in favor of H.R. 1304, the
"Quality Health-Care Coalition Act," by more than a 2-1 margin. The bill,
introduced by Rep. Tom Campbell, would allow doctors and other health care
professionals to engage in collective bargaining with HMOs - a practice that
would otherwise violate existing antitrust laws. Supporters argue that this
measure will "level the playingfield" between doctors and HMOs and will allow
doctors to bargain for medical policies that will improve patient care. Opponents
counter that the Campbell Bill will raise health care costs without producing
higher quality medical services. The Senate did not vote on the Campbell Bill
during the 2000 session, but it may consider the bill during the coming year.
This note begins by reviewing the criticisms of IMOs that led to the
introduction of H.R. 1304 and other proposed reforms. It then summarizes the
relevant antitrust laws and labor laws that form the background to this
controversy. Finally, it analyzes the Campbell Bill and considers the possible
effects that H.R. 1304 would have on the American health care system if it were
to become law. This note concludes that H.R. 1304 would increase health care
costs without necessarily improving patient care and that new exceptions to the
antitrust laws are not warranted by existing market conditions in the health care
sector. Instead of enacting H.R. 1304, this note recommends active enforcement
of existing antitrust laws.
* J.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School, 2001. B.A., Brandeis University, 1998.
Managing Editor, Stanford Law Review, Volume 53. Thanks to Ailsa Chang, Brian Leaf,
and all the editors of the Stanford Law Review who worked on this note, as well as Professor
Henry Greely and the students of the Health Law and Policy seminar. The most important
thanks go to my grandparents, Dr. Joseph and Elise Shapiro, for all of their love and support.
STANFORD LAWREVIEW
INTRODUCTION
In March 1999, Rep. Tom Campbell (R-CA) introduced H.R 1304, the
"Quality Health-Care Coalition Act."' At a press conference announcing the
bill's introduction, Rep. Campbell-joined by a Democratic co-sponsor, Rep.
John Conyers (D-MI)--explained that H.R. 1304 would attempt to "level the
playing field between HMOs and health care providers and return medical
[decisionmaking] from insurance administrators to individual physicians
... and their patients."2 This legislation, he declared, is "the best way to let the
market deal with the complaints so many health care professionals have raised
with HIMOs." 3
The premise of H.R. 1304 is simple: Doctors should be allowed to engage
in collective bargaining with health plans.4  As discussed below, such
collective action is generally barred at present by antitrust laws. By overriding
these antitrust laws and providing health care providers with collective
bargaining rights, the bill would, according to its sponsors, "level the playing
field" between providers and HMOs.5 As the American Medical Association
(AMA)-a powerful proponent of the Campbell Bill-argues, collective
bargaining powers would provide "a counterbalance to the growing power of
insurers" who would otherwise "choose profits over patients." 6
The premise of H.R. 1304 is not only simple; it is politically popular as
well. After its introduction, the Campbell Bill quickly attracted support from
across the political spectrum,7 building a bipartisan list of co-sponsors that
1. H.R. 1304, 106th Cong. (2000). All references in this note to H.R. 1304 refer to the
version of the bill approved by the House of Representatives on June 30, 2000. For
simplicity, I will occasionally refer to H.R. 1304 throughout this note as the "Campbell Bill."
2. Congressman Tom Campbell, Congressmen Campbell, Conyers, & Over Twenty
Cosponsors Introduce Bipartisan Bill on Patient Care (Mar. 25, 1999) (press release),
available at http:/www.house.gov/campbell/990325.htm.
3. Id.
4. H.R. 1304 would apply not only to doctors, but also to all other types of "health care
professionals." H.R. 1304, § 2(a). This term is further defined in § 20)(3) of the bill.
However, in order to limit the scope of this note, I will discuss H.R. 1304 only as it relates to
doctors, and thus "health care providers" is used as a proxy for "doctors."
5. In this note, I am using the term "HMO" (Health Maintenance Organization) as a
generic stand-in for all managed care plans. I recognize that this shorthand is inaccurate; the
various types of managed care organizations are structured very differently. However, the
myriad of differences between managed care structures is beyond the scope of this note, and
most commentary on this general topic, in both the academic and popular press, has used the
term "HMO" to refer to all managed care organizations. By its terms, the Campbell Bill
would apply not only to HMOs, but also to negotiations with any "group health plan" or
other "health insurance issuer." Id. § 2(j)(2)(A).
6. American Medical Association, AMA Applauds Campbell Bill's Advance as a
Victory for Patients and Physicians (Mar. 30, 2000) (press release), available at
http://www.ama-assn.orglama/basic/article/201-622-1.html.
7. Co-sponsors ran the political gamut from those generally classified as liberals
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eventually included more than half the members of the House of
Representatives.8 Although it took more than fifteen months to bring the bill to
the House floor, H.R. 1304 passed the House by an overwhelming 276-136
margin on June 30, 2000, when it finally came up for a vote.9 Due to
opposition from Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and other Senate
Republican leaders, the Campbell Bill remained bottled up in a Senate
committee for the remainder of the 106th Congress.1o However, the bill will
certainly be reintroduced in the Senate during the upcoming term.1" In short,
H.R. 1304 stands a substantial chance of becoming law within the next couple
of years.
Notwithstanding its chances of passage, the Campbell Bill also touches on
some of the most fundamental questions currently facing the health care
industry: Does the distribution of power between HMOs and physicians need
to be "balanced"? If so, what is the best way to achieve the proper
equilibrium? Who should be responsible for making final decisions about
patient care? The Campbell Bill offers one set of answers to these questions,
but other legislators and commentators offer competing recommendations and
solutions. Whether or not H.R. 1304 becomes law, the debate over these
questions will be central to American political dialogue for years to come. The
decisions ultimately made in the political realm-through votes on H.R. 1304
and other related measures-will play a major role in defining the character of
the U.S. health care system.
For these reasons-because H.R. 1304 stands a substantial chance of
becoming law and because the questions it raises are fundamental to the future
of American health care-it is important to analyze both the need for such
legislation and the impact that H.R. 1304 would have upon the health care
industry if enacted. In attempting to address these issues, this note will proceed
in four Parts. First, Part I will set the scene by discussing the major criticisms
that doctors have leveled at HMOs. Rep. Campbell has made doctor
(including Conyers, Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), and Rep. Robert Wexler (D-FL)) to some of
the most recognizable conservatives in Congress (including Rep. Bob Barr (R-GA) and Rep.
Lindsey Graham (R-SC)).
8. When passed, the bill was co-sponsored by 218 members of the House. For a list of
co-sponsors, see American Medical Association, Antitrust Relief: Cosponsors of HR 1304,
available at http:/vww.ama-assn.orglamafbasic/article/201-416-l.html.
9. Robert Pear, Doctors' Antitrust Hopes Face a Roadblock from Lot, N.Y. TimEs,
July 1, 2000, at A9.
10. Id. Sen. Lott, voicing his displeasure with the bill, stated: "I don't think we need
more, you know, labor unions in America. And that's basically what they're trying to do.
So I certainly don't look on it favorably. And I won't be trying to find a way to pass it, I'll
tell you that." Id.
11. Rep. Campbell, however, will not be a member of Congress for the 107th session.
Instead of running for reelection in 2000, Rep. Cambell challenged Sen. Dianne Feinstein
(D-CA) for her U.S. Senate seat. He was soundly defeated and has announced that he will
return to Stanford Law School to teach antitrust law. See Mark Simon, Feinstein Triumphs
with Ease, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 8, 2000, at AS.
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complaints about IMOs a major justification for his legislation. Part II will
then explain the existing legal framework within which the debate takes place.
H.R. 1304 straddles two significant legal disciplines, antitrust law and labor
law, and this Part will review the application of these legal regimes to doctors
and HMOs. Next, Part III will present the Campbell Bill itself and outline its
major features. Finally, Part IV will analyze the possible effects that H.R. 1304
would have on the American health care system were it to become law. This
last Part will examine questions of health care quality, bargaining power
between HMOs and doctors, and cost.
I. DOCTOR COMPLAINTS ABOUT HMOS
According to M. Kathleen Kenyon, general counsel to a physicians'
association, "Physicians want two things: [t]o practice high quality medicine
[and to] be successful financially." 12 As both statistical studies and a large
number of anecdotal accounts have revealed, doctors increasingly feel that
managed care organizations compromise their ability to achieve both of these
goals.
Recent survey data indicates that doctors believe managed care
arrangements can reduce the quality of patient services. 13 For example, one
1996 survey found that a majority of doctors responding felt that cost-cutting
measures imposed by managed care organizations-including limitations on
patient choice of specialists, frequency of specialist visits, and length of
hospital stays-were having a negative impact on the quality of patient care. 14
12. M. Kathleen Kenyon, The Physician's Perspective: Current Antitrust Issues for
Provider-Payer Networks, in ANTITRUST AND HEALTH CARE: Nmv APPROACHES AND
CHALLENGES 157, 158 (Douglas C. Ross ed., 1998) [hereinafter ANTrrRUST AND HEALTHCARE]-
13. Whether managed care does, in fact, lead to lower-quality patient care is a highly
contested question beyond the scope of this note.
14. Debra S. Feldman, Dennis H. Novack & Edward Gracely, Effects of Managed
Care on Physician-Patient Relationships, Quality of Care, and the Ethical Practice of
Medicine: A Physician Survey, 158 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1626, 1628 fig.3, 1630-31
(1998); see also Eve A. Kerr, Ron D. Hays, Brian S. Mittman, Albert L. Siu, Barbara Leake
& Robert H. Brook, Primary Care Physicians' Satisfaction with Quality of Care in
California Capitated Medical Groups, 278 JAMA 308, 308 (1997) (reporting that 51% of
California doctors caring for patients covered by capitated or managed care contracts
(including both medical group practices and independent practice associations) were "very
or somewhat satisfied" with their ability to treat managed care patients according to their
own best judgment, compared with a 79% satisfaction rate for doctors treating patients in
their overall practice). But see Susan A. Flocke, A. John Orzano, H. Andrew Selinger,
James J. Werner, Laurie Vovel, Paul A. Nutting & Kurt C. Strange, Does Managed Care
Restrictiveness Affect the Perceived Quality of Primary Care? A Report from ASPN, 48 J.
FAM. PRAc. 762, 767 (1999) (finding that less than 25% of managed care doctors surveyed
felt that limiting referrals and seeing more patients per day led to compromised patient care).
The Flocke study did find, however, that "both financial and organizational restrictiveness
were associated with greater clinician-reported hassle." Id. at 766.
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Survey data has also shown that physicians working under financial pressure to
reduce the amount of care they provide are more likely to be professionally
dissatisfied. 15
While taking its toll on professional satisfaction, managed care also
appears to be exerting some downward pressure on physician incomes. The
evidence on this point, however, is somewhat ambiguous. In 1994, average
physician income dropped almost 4% from the previous year, the first time that
nominal earnings went down since annual income statistics were first
collected. 16 There is some indication that this drop is at least partially a result
of the proliferation of managed care arrangements. A study linking managed
care penetration to the decline in physician earnings found a "direct, although
weak, association." 17 A more recent study, however, found a bifurcation: the
effect of managed care has been to raise the incomes of primary care
physicians, while putting downward pressures on the earnings of hospital-based
specialists such as radiologists and pathologists.18
Whether or not managed care is slowing the growth rate of physicians'
incomes, it is worth noting that physician salaries have been rising for some
time and are still relatively high compared with other professions. Between
1982 and 1994, median physician income rose by an average annual rate of
5.9% in nominal terms, and 2.1% when adjusted for inflation. 19 As of 1997,
the mean average annual income for physicians and surgeons was $102,020,20
15. E.g., Michael D. Burdi & Laurence C. Baker, Physicians' Perceptions of
Autonomy and Satisfaction in California, HEALTH Air., July/Aug. 1999, at 134, 141 ("In
every case we examined, the proportion of [California] physicians indicating that they were
highly satisfied with their practice or would attend medical school again fell between 1991
and 1996."); Jack Hadley, Jean M. Mitchell, Daniel P. Sulmasy & M. Gregg Bloche,
Perceived Financial Incentives, HMO Market Penetration, and Physicians' Practice Styles
and Satisfaction, 34 HEALTH SERviCEs REs. 307, 307 (1999) ("Compared with physicians
with a neutral incentive, physicians with an incentive to reduce services were from 1.5 to 3.5
times more likely to be very dissatisfied with their practices and were 0.2 to 0.5 times as
likely to report that their expectations regarding professional autonomy and ability to
practice good-quality medicine were met.").
16. Carol J. Simon & Patricia H. Born, Physician Earnings in a Changing Managed
Care Environment, HEALTH AFF., Dec. 1996, at 124, 124.
17. Id. at 128. The study concluded that "[m]any of these results are consistent with
the purported impact of managed care, but many require a broader set of explanations." Id.
at 132.
18. Carol J. Simon, David Dranove & William D. White, The Impact of Managed Care
on the Physician Marketplace, 112 PuB. HEALTH REP. 222, 222 (1997) ("Between 1985 and
1995, states with the fastest growth in managed care penetration saw the highest rate of
growth in primary care physicians' income and the slowest rate of growth in [radiologist,
anesthesiologist, and pathologist] physicians' income.").
19. Simon & Born, supra note 16, at 124. The rate of growth did slow, however, in
the 1990s. See id. at 125.
20. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 1998 National Occupational
Employment and Wage Estimates, available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/national/
oes32102.htm
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while the median income was approximately $164,000.21 As the American
Coalition for Consumer Choice in Health Care-an alliance of health plans,
business groups, and others that have joined forces to oppose H.R. 130422--
points out, the gap between the incomes of the average physician and the
average American worker increased significantly from the mid-1980s to the
mid-1990s. 23
While the statistical impact of managed care on physicians' incomes may
be unclear, there have been many newspaper articles citing stories of doctors'
frustrations with managed care organizations. For example, the New York
Times reported the following story:
In the last five years, Dr. [Anthony] Tonzola, a general surgeon, has seen
the payment for mastectomies drop from $2,500 to $900. His personal income
has gone down by two-thirds. But even beyond the financial consequences, he
has seen his authority as a physician undercut by having to get on the phone
every time he wants to make a medical judgment. "We no longer make
decisions," he says. "The mood in the doctor's lounge is one of frustration,
depression and anger."2
4
Similarly, the Chicago Tribune profiled a local doctor's frustration with the
medical policies of HMOs:
HMOs dictate to us how to write our chart notes... how much time you will
spend with the patient... how much insurance you'll carry and in what form,
what specialists you will refer your patients to... what drugs you can and
can't use to treat a particular patient's disease, when patients have to leave the
hospital, [and] how much you will be paid ... -25
Interviews with other doctors yielded similar statements printed in newspapers
all over the country.2 6
21. Tom Abate, Doctors Examine Union Option, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 3, 1999, at Cl;
see also Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1304 Before the House
Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. 258 (1999) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Bill Jones on
behalf of the Antitrust Coalition for Consumer Choice in Health Care) (estimating the
median physician income to have been $166,000 in 1996), available at
http:llcommdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju62446.000/hju62446_Of.htm.
22. For a listing of Coalition members, see Hearings, supra note 21, at 271-73. The
Coalition's members include large health plan providers such as Aetna, Humana, Cigna, and
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, as well as business groups including the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers.
23. Id. at 258 (noting that while in 1985, the average physician earned 5.27 times the
income of the average American worker, the multiple had increased to 6.51 by 1996).
24. Debra Galant, Organized Medicine, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 1998, § 14NJ, at 4.
25. Doctors Seeking to Unionize: A Remedy?, Cm. TRB., Feb. 1, 1998, Business
Section, at ION.
26. E.g., Abate, supra note 21, at Cl ("We are literally being deprived of the ability to
take care of our patients ... by some HMO dingdong with a clipboard . . . ."); Steven
Greenhouse, Angered by HMO's Treatment, More Doctors Are Joining Unions, N.Y. TIMs,
Feb. 4, 1999, at Al ("Medicine has gone from a mom-and-pop operation to corporatization,
which has left the provider, the doctor, out of medical decision-making."); Andy Miller,
Doctors Angry at HMOs, Insurers, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 31, 1999, at 1H (discussing
doctors' frustrations with "[flees cut to the bone," "[c]laims going unpaid for three months
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It is not surprising that doctors are upset with some of the practices of
HMOs. For one, there is no question that most HMOs do exert control over the
medical decisions of individual providers. As the associate general counsel to
the Health Law Division of the AMA has noted, "Typically, a health plan will
consult with a limited number of physicians drawn from outside of the plan to
make its medical management decisions, but the managers of the health plans,
who are often non-physicians, make the ultimate decisions about medical
policy matters." 27 This has left doctors feeling disenchanted. As Grace Budrys
summarizes, "Health sector organizations are becoming increasingly larger,
more centralized, and hierarchical; the doctors who interact with them perceive
themselves to be more and more divorced from the centers of power where
decisions are made without their input and, for that matter, over their
objections." 2 8
In addition, many doctors feel powerless to combat the market power of
HMOs. More than ninety percent of the nation's physicians now have at least
one contract with a managed care company, and eighty percent of recent
medical school graduates are taking salaried positions with HMOs, clinics, or
hospitals.29  As greater numbers of people join managed care plans-179
million people belonged to HMOs or PPOs in 19973 0-doctors are finding it
harder and harder to avoid dealing with HMOs whose policies they dislike.3 1
or longer," and "[m]edical decisions made to enhance corporate profits, not patients' well-
being"); Jim Nesbitt, Doctors Unionize to Fight HMO: Physicians Want Say in Care,
Contracts, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 13, 1998, at 1H ("[Physicians are] frustrated. They don't
have any clout. Suddenly, they don't have a voice at the table when it comes to
compensation and patient care.').
27. Edward B. Hirshfeld, The Case for Antitrust Reform for Physician Groups, in
HEALTH CARE REFORM AND ANrrrRusT 97, 109 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. A-694, 1994). As a matter of course, HMOs deny that they make any
medical decisions-insisting that they only make coverage decisions. This is somewhat
disingenuous, however. First, there is often little practical difference between coverage
decisions and treatment decisions: treatments that are not covered are not performed.
Second, HMOs have been known to drop physicians from their plans when the doctors
violate the medical policies of the plans by ordering too many tests or performing too many
services. E.g., Toni Vranjes, Unions Team Up to Fight Perceived HMO Abuses, MED.
INDUs. TODAY, Sept. 5, 1997.
28. GPAcE BUDRYS, WHEN DocToRs JoIN UNIONs 143 (1997). Related to concerns
about autonomy, doctors are also concerned about a decline in their professional status in
recent years. Explaining why, in her view, doctors need to join unions, Budrys states: "The
short answer is that over the last two decades, doctors' roles and relationships have been
transformed from being defined by status to being defined by contract." Id. at 141.
29. Greenhouse, supra note 26.
30. Hearings, supra note 21, at 158 (statement of E. Ratcliffe Anderson, Jr., Executive
Vice President & CEO, American Medical Association) (citing a study by the American
Association of Health Plans). Preferred Provider Organizations ("PPOs") are another type of
managed care entity. PPOs control costs by giving economic incentives to patients to
patronize certain providers that have agreed to accept supervision and reduced fees. See
CBS HealthWatch, Medical Dictionary, at http://healthwatch.medscape.com/medscape/
p/Glibrary/medicaldictionary.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2000).
31. Cf. Richard M. Scheffler, Physician Collective Bargaining: A Turning Point in
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According to the AMA, the market power of HMOs can be measured
indirectly by examining the contract terms doctors have been willing to accept.
The CEO of the AMA, Dr. E. Ratcliffe Anderson, Jr., testified before Congress:
Evidence of the high degree of leverage that health plans have over physicians
is found in contracts-that physicians must sign with managed care plans-
that are clearly unreasonable on their face. These contracts are one-sided in
favor of the health plan. The health plans allow physicians no leverage in
contract negotiations. In fact, there rarely are contract negotiations. The
contracts are often issued on a "take it or leave it" basis. The AMA is aware
of physicians who have been denied contracts because they attempted to
negotiate over terms. The health plans are able to dictate the terms on which
they deal with physicians, and the physicians have to accept them.32
Some contract terms that the AMA points to as evidence of this problem
include:
* terms that use "lowest cost" language in defining medical necessity;
* "gag clauses" barring physicians from telling patients about treatment
alternatives that they might recommend but are not deemed "medically
necessary" by the HMO because of cost;33
• "all products" policies that require physicians to agree to participate in
medical plans that might be offered at later dates-with no knowledge of
the terms of these plans or their medical policies;
* clauses that allow the HMO to change the terms of fee schedules at will;
and
* provisions that assign all liability for covered services to the physician
while requiring the doctor to indemnify the HMO against any claims.34
The AMA also notes that quality of care might be harmed by the lack of
contractual provisions for which doctors would negotiate if they had the power
to do so. This might include terms that would allow patients easier access to
prescription drugs normally not on the HMO's approved list or would allow
doctors greater discretion in making medical decisions.35
While many doctors feel that HMOs are threatening their ability to practice
high-quality medicine and to succeed financially, the legal system constrains
US. Medicine, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1071, 1073 (1999) ("[P]hysicians are locked
into the corporate medical care system financially, but also ... morally. That is, for doctors
to turn their backs on managed care is hazardous not only to their incomes but also the well-
being of their patients, who cannot afford to follow their doctors out of their health plans and
out of their insurance coverage.").
32. Hearings, supra note 21, at 160.
33. The AMA's concerns over this contract term are somewhat alleviated by the fact
that at least 46 states now ban "gag clauses." Robert Pear, States Take Lead in Health
Legislation, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 14, 1998, at A12. The U.S. Senate approved a federal law
banning gag clauses in 1999, but it has not been enacted. Helen Dewar, On Managed Care,
Senate GOP United with Strategy of Offense, WASH. POST, July 18, 1999, at A16.
34. Hearings, supra note 21, at 160-65 (statement of E. Ratcliffe Anderson, CEO,
AMA).
35. Id. at 165.
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their range of possible responses. In particular, antitrust law significantly limits
the ability of competing doctors to bargain collectively when setting contract
terms with HMOs. Labor law-which does permit collective bargaining in
some circumstances-generally does not extend to physicians, especially those
who are not salaried employees of HMOs. H.R. 1304 would alter this legal
landscape and permit physicians and other health care professionals to engage
in collective bargaining. However, before examining the merits of the
Campbell Bill and possible alternatives, it is important to review the basic
outlines of antitrust law and labor law, which inform the current debate.
Il. THE LEGAL BACKDROP
A. Antitrust Law
The basic purpose of antitrust law is to "promote free competition by
prohibiting acts or practices that interfere with competition."'3 6 To this end,
section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (the "Act") broadly states that "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . .. is hereby declared
to be illegal."'3 7 Though the Act declares that "every" combination or
conspiracy that restrains trade is illegal, the Supreme Court has construed the
Act to prohibit only agreements that unreasonably restrain trade.38 Therefore,
most allegations of section 1 violations are analyzed under a "rule of reason"
test that compares an agreement's procompetitive and anticompetitive features.
To determine whether a particular agreement is legal, analysis under the rule of
reason considers market conditions, procompetitive justifications, effects of the
agreement, and other relevant facts. 39 The Supreme Court has found particular
types of agreements, however, to be illegal per se. When the per se rule is
applied, the agreement is conclusively presumed to be a violation of the
Sherman Act, and no procompetitive justifications can be offered to show that
the agreement is reasonable.4 0
36. HEALTHCARE COMM., SECnON OF ANriTRUST LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N, THE
ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK IlI1 (Roxanne C. Busey, Kevin E. Grady & Phillip A.
Proger eds., 1993) [hereinafter HEALTH CARB HANDBOOK].
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1(1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
38. E.g., Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988); NCAA v.
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984).
39. The most commonly cited version of the rule of reason was stated by Justice Louis
Brandeis in 1918: "The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition." Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,
238 (1918).
40. E.g., State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) ("Per se treatment is appropriate
'once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with
confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it' ..... ") (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa
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The Court has deemed five general categories of agreements to be per se
violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act: price fixing (horizontal and
vertical), horizontal market divisions, tying arrangements, group boycotts, and
reciprocal dealing arrangements.41 For the purposes of this note, the most
relevant prohibition is the ban on horizontal price fixing. Briefly stated,
horizontal price fixing is cooperation among producers of the same product or
service to eliminate or reduce competition based on price.42 The Supreme
Court has defined "price fixing" agreements expansively, including within the
definition any "combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of
raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in
interstate or foreign commerce . . . . 43 Price fixing violations can subject
offenders to criminal penalties, including imprisonment.44
Prior to the 1970s, legal scholars assumed that the antitrust laws did not
generally apply to health care providers for two reasons. First, it was thought
that most health care services did not affect interstate commerce (and therefore
did not fall under the purview of the Sherman Act), and secondly, the common
law had held that "learned professions" were exempted from federal antitrust
rules and subject only to state regulation 4 5 But in the mid-1970s, the Supreme
Court reversed its earlier decisions and held that federal antitrust law could
indeed be applied to doctors and other health care providers. In 1975, the Court
disavowed the "learned professions" doctrine in a case involving lawyers.4 6
County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982)).
41. See Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 344 n.15; 1 JULLAN 0. VoN KALINowsKI, PETER
SULLIVAN & MAUREEN McGUmL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 12.02[2][b],
at 2-22 (2d ed. 1999).
42. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1208 (7th ed. 1999).
43. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). The rule of
Socony-Vacuum, however, is not applied literally in all cases. Despite the broad wording,
several types of agreements that have an impact on price are, in fact, legal. See Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979) ("Not all arrangements among actual or potential
competitors that have an impact on price are per se violations of the Sherman Act or even
unreasonable restraints. Mergers among competitors eliminate competition, including price
competition, but they are not per se illegal, and many of them withstand attack under any
existing antitrust standard. Joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements are also not
usually unlawful, at least not as price-fixing schemes, where the agreement on price is
necessary to market the product at all."); see also NCAA v. Board.of Regents, 468 U.S. at
101 (noting that college football is "an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition
are essential if the product is to be available at all").
44. Individuals who violate section 1 of the Sherman Act are potentially subject to a
fine of up to $350,000 and maximum imprisonment of three years. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
45. HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 1. Federal case law before the 1970s
suggested that lawyers and doctors were professionals who were not involved in "trade or
commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act. E.g., FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S.
643, 653 (1931) ("[Medical practitioners] follow a profession and not a trade....').
46. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975) ("We cannot find support
for the proposition that Congress intended any such sweeping exclusion [for learned
professions). The nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from
the Sherman Act .... ).
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The following year, the Court indicated in Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of
Rex Hospital that health care activities had a sufficient nexus to interstate
commerce to justify application of the Sherman Act.47 Finally, in 1982, the
Court made it clear that "the health care industry was fully subject to federal
antitrust laws and was not entitled to any special immunity or relaxed antitrust
standard."48
Following these decisions, it is now clear that any agreement between
competing doctors to raise, lower, or otherwise fix prices for their services is
illegal per se. In 1990, the Department of Justice showed that it was willing to
prosecute price fixing by health care professionals in United States v. Alston.49
In Alston, the Justice Department prosecuted three Arizona dentists who had
collaborated to convince prepaid dental plans whose members they served to
increase their capitation and co-payment fees.5 0 In addition to outright price
fixing, attempts to jointly negotiate contract terms with health plans or other
third parties can be characterized as group boycotts, which are also illegal per
se. In the years since Alston, the government has continued to actively pursue
violations of the Sherman Act by health care providers:
[F]ederal enforcers have prosecuted dozens of actions against physician cartels
that have operated to restrict competition through collective actions including
boycotts of managed care entities or those who cooperated with managed care
entities, collective negotiations through trade associations or "sham" PPOs,
and efforts to thwart entry by competitive clinics or alternative care
providers.5 1
In light of these legal restrictions, a handbook advising health care providers on
antitrust issues suggests: "In negotiating contracts with insurers or other third-
47. 425 U.S. 738 (1976) (finding that a hospital's attempt to constrain a competitor
from expanding its hospital sufficiently implicated the Commerce Clause powers of
Congress).
48. HEALTH CARE REFORM TASK FORCE, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N, IDENTIFICATION AND DEsCRIPTION OF ANTITRUST AND COMPETITIVE ISSUES RAISED BY
KEY HEALTH CARE REFORM BILLS 3 (1994) [hereinafter ANTITRUST ISSUES] (citing the
Court's decision in Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982)). That
decision found an agreement among competing physicians to set the maximum fees that they
would claim as payment for health services provided to policyholders of specific insurance
plans to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act. See also Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas,
500 U.S. 322 (1991) (finding that revocation of a single doctor's staff privileges had a
sufficient effect on interstate commerce to support a finding of federal jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act).
49. 974 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1992). This was the first antitrust criminal prosecution of
a health care provider in fifty years. HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 6.
50. In the trial court, all three defendants were convicted after a jury trial. The judge
then granted two of the defendants' motions for acquittal notwithstanding the verdict, and
granted a new trial to the third defendant. The Justice Department appealed and the Ninth
Circuit reversed, remanding the cases for new trials. Alston, 974 F.2d.at 1215. In the end,
the defendants entered into a plea agreement, ending the case. HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK,
supra note 36, at 6.
51. Thomas L. Greaney, Antitrust and the Healthcare Industry: The View from the
Three Branches, 32 J. HEALTH & HoSp. L. 391, 399 (1999).
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party payors, a provider should act independently. Consultations or agreements
with other providers about dealings with third parties should be avoided to
eliminate even the appearance of an illegal boycott."5 2
Despite these potential violations, other types of agreements between
doctors are not illegal per se. The antitrust laws do not bar horizontal
combinations of competitors, where, for example, two physicians merge their
practices, "provided that the merger does not result in an unacceptably large
concentration of market power."53 A murky legal area exists where providers
partially integrate their practices but still act as competitors at some level-for
example, when physicians form joint ventures or "IPAs" (Independent Practice
Associations).5 4 In these cases, the general rule is that the "rule of reason" will
apply, and the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission will
not challenge these joint ventures when there is 1) shared financial risk among
the participants; 2) significant investment in clinical integration; and 3) no sign
of excessive market dominance. 55 The FTC and the DOJ have combined to
issue complicated guidelines detailing what types of joint ventures are
permitted.5 6 The guidelines clearly state, however, that the government will
challenge joint ventures, such as IPAs, when they serve only as "'shams' for
cartel-like price fixing."'57
In short, current antitrust law prohibits collective action by independent
doctors that is designed to raise the level of payment for their services or to
force HMOs to accept certain contract terms. Such actions are generally
characterized as price fixing or horizontal boycotts, which are illegal per se.
However, doctors may avoid these proscriptions by merging their medical
practices into larger groups or by combining their practices to a lesser degree
52. HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 61-62.
53. Hirshfeld, supra note 27, at 111.
54. IPAs are health care networks formed by doctors. While maintaining their own
offices and treating their own patients, doctors who form IPAs also agree to treat enrollees in
the IPA for a negotiated lump sum or a fixed payment per member or per service provided.
See CBS HealthWatch, Medical Dictionary, at http://healthwatch.medscape.com/medscape/
p/G library/medicaldictionary.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2000). While owned and operated by
doctors, IPAs are a form of capitated care where the member doctors have a financial
incentive to restrict the amount of care provided.
55. See Kenyon, supra note 12, at 167-68.
56. U.S. Dept. of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Revised Statements of Antitrust
Enforcement Policy in Health Care (Aug. 28, 1996), available at http://www.fic.govl
reports/hlth3s.htm [hereinafter Statements of Enforcement].
57. Robert J. Enders, Hospital Counseling Issues: The Antitrust "Hot Spots" in
Contracting Networks, in ANTrrRUsT AND HEALTH CARE, supra note 12, at 129, 134 (1998).
See In re Preferred Physicians, Inc., 110 F.T.C. 157 (1988) (consent order prohibiting
agreement among doctors to resist competitive pressures from health plans to discount fees
and to refuse reimbursement on any basis other than the traditional fee-for-service method of
payment); Statements of Enforcement, supra note 56, at Statement 8, Part C.3 (stating that
an IPA will be challenged as per se unlawful where it is "merely a vehicle for collective
decisions by its physicians on price and other significant terms of dealing" and where "[t]he
physicians' purpose in forming the IPA is to increase their bargaining power with payers").
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through Independent Practice Associations.
Labor law provides another possible exception to the prohibitions against
price fixing and group boycotts. Through the laws of collective bargaining,
some groups of employees are allowed to jointly negotiate salary and other
contract issues with their employers, even though the employees are in
horizontal competition with each other. H.R. 1304 would expand this
exemption and allow doctors and other health care professionals to negotiate
collectively with health plans. A review of labor law will demonstrate how
H.R. 1304 represents a dramatic shift from the past and present of collective
bargaining.
B. Labor Law
The laws of collective bargaining are generally a crosscurrent that disrupts
the overall direction of antitrust law. While antitrust law seeks to prevent any
collusive action by competitors, labor law seeks to encourage collective action
in specified cases. With the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (also known
as the NLRA or the Wagner Act), Congress clarified the legal right of
employees to form unions, bargain collectively, and work cooperatively to
improve working conditions and wages.5 8 Recognizing the unequal bargaining
power that existed between employers and individual employees, Congress
made a conscious choice to promote collective bargaining over general antitrust
principles of unfettered markets. In brief, with the NLRA, Congress created a
large antitrust exemption for persons covered under the Act.5 9
To be protected under the NLRA, however, one must be an "employee," as
defined therein.60 Any collective bargaining or coordinated action by persons
who are not considered "employees" is a form of price fixing and therefore
illegal.6 1 Physicians have historically been excluded from the NLRA's
protection because the Act's definition of employee expressly excludes "any
58. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
59. The NLRA also created the National Labor Relations Board to oversee union
elections and to prevent unfair labor practices. Id. § 153. See also FRANK B. CRoss &
ROGER LEROY MILLER, WEST'S LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESs 451 (3d ed. 1998)
(summarizing the NLRA).
60. The NLRA defines "employee" as follows:
The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees
of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include
any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any
current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any
other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual
employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his
home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the
status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any
individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from
time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994) (emphasis added).
61. BuDRYs, supra note 28, at 113.
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individual having the status of an independent contractor" as well as "any
individual employed as a supervisor." 62
Are doctors independent contractors? Physicians who are self-employed in
independent practice are considered to be independent contractors and therefore
do not fall within the NLRA's scope. In theory, a health plan could exert
enough control over a physician that the physician could be considered a de
facto employee-perhaps if one HMO constituted a majority of the doctor's
practice. Thus far, however, the courts have not identified such a case. As the
AMA has noted, self-employed doctors are likely to be treated as independent
contractors because "most physicians have contracts with a number of health
plans and do not derive a majority of their non-Medicare income from any
given plan."'63  A labor union in New Jersey recently challenged this
characterization in an attempt to organize doctors who were members of the
AmeriHealth HMO network of health care providers. However, the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in October 1999 upheld a Regional Director's
decision that the physicians were independent contractors and not employees of
the HMO. 64
Even doctors who are not self-employed are not necessarily "employees"
within the meaning of the NLRA. Although it seems logical that salaried
doctors employed directly by HMOs would be "employees," the NLRB still
considers most doctors in this category to be "supervisors. ' '65 Physicians have
had to struggle with the legacy of NLRB v. Yeshiva University,66 which ruled
that university faculty members hold "managerial status" because they sit on
committees charged with making both academic policies and faculty hiring and
promotion decisions. Since doctors employed by health plans are usually
members of committees responsible for organizational governance decisions,
the Yeshiva standard often applies to them. Other courts have held more simply
that physicians are supervisors because their decisions direct other members of
the health care team, such as nurses, technicians, and residents.67 In the past
two years, however, the NLRB has relaxed its stance somewhat and has
62. See note 60 supra.
63. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, AMERICAN MED. Ass'N, REPORT No. 30, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AS AN AMA ADVOCACY TOOL 6 (1999), available at http://vwwv.ama-
assn.orglmeetings/public/annual99/reports/botlbotrtf/botrep3O.rtf [hereinafter REPORT 30].
64. AmeriHealth Inc., No. 4-RC-19260, 1999 NLRB LEXIS 745 (Oct. 18, 1999).
However, in denying review of the Regional Director's decision, the Board stated that it was
"not necessarily precluding a finding that physicians under contract to health maintenance
organizations may, in other circumstances, be found to be statutory employees." Id. at *1.
See also AmeriHealth, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 509 (1998) (reversing Regional Director's earlier
dismissal of case and remanding for a full hearing on the question of independent contractor
versus employee status).
65. BUDRYS, supra note 28, at 118-19.
66. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
67. RFPORT 30, supra note 63, at 10; cf NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of
America, 511 U.S. 571 (1994) (finding that nurses who incidentally directed others in the
course of patient treatment were "supervisors" within the meaning of the NLRA).
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certified three physician bargaining units. 68  In these cases, however,
department heads with greater supervisory responsibilities were excluded from
the union.6 9 Overall, however, the courts have given no clear guidance as to
when a physician is considered to be a "supervisor. '70
Although federal labor law in this area is rather murky, states have some
power to override federal law through the "state action doctrine." Under this
doctrine-technically a closer relative to antitrust law than to labor law-state
governments are immune from federal antitrust scrutiny when acting in their
sovereign capacity.71 Using this power, California acted in 1981 to permit
collective bargaining by doctors employed by state or local government
agencies.72
In sum, doctors are currently prohibited by federal law from bargaining
collectively with health plans or HMOs unless they 1) merge their practices; 2)
form a joint venture that meets certain risk-sharing criteria set out by the DOJ
and the FTC;73 or 3) are employed directly by a health plan and are not
considered "supervisors." For all other doctors who interact with health plans
or HMOs, collective bargaining on any issue relating to employment is strictly
prohibited by federal antitrust rules. Past cases have held that the vast majority
of doctors fall into this latter category and are precluded from bargaining
collectively with HMOs. H.R. 1304, however, would change this legal
landscape.
I. H.R. 1304
To eliminate the barriers to collective action that doctors face, Rep. Tom
Campbell introduced H.R. 1304, the "Quality Health-Care Coalition Act."
H.R. 1304 would restructure the antitrust rules relating to doctors and other
health care professionals, allowing them to form their own professional
associations to bargain with health plans and HMOs when setting contract
68. REPORT 30, supra note 63, at 10. Currently, about 40,000 salaried physicians are
unionized. Michael M. Weinstein, If Doctors Win the Right to Organize, Patients Could
Lose, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1999, at C2.
69. REPORT30, supra note 63, at 10.
70. Note that even physicians who are considered to be "employees" and are certified
by the NLRB as a bargaining unit can bargain collectively only with respect to employment
issues. The fact that the employer HMO also serves as payer is incidental-the physicians
could not negotiate collectively with respect to payment decisions of the health plan.
71. See ROBERT N. CORLEY, 0. LEE REED, PETER J. SHEDD & JERE W. MOREHEAD,
THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF BusiNEss 298 (11th ed. 1999). The state
action doctrine is also referred to as the Parker-Brown Doctrine, since it was established by
the case of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Under the Parker-Brown Doctrine, "the
Sherman Act [does] not apply to anticompetitive restraints imposed by the States 'as an act
of government."' City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 370 (1991)
(quoting Parker, 317 U.S. at 352).
72. See BuDRYS, supra note 28, at 121.
73. See notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
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terms. In addition, it would provide these health care professionals with the
"same treatment under the antitrust laws as ... bargaining units which are
recognized under the National Labor Relations Act."74
After more than a year of consideration and two rounds of hearings, the
House Judiciary Committee approved H.R. 1304 by an overwhelming 26-2
margin on March 30, 2000. Although the Speaker of the House, Rep. Dennis
Hastert (R-IL), delayed the bill from reaching the House floor for three months,
he eventually relented.75 As its last measure of business before the Fourth of
July recess, the House passed the bill by more than a 2-1 margin in the early
morning hours of June 30, 2000.76 The bill failed to reach the Senate floor for
a vote during the 2000 session, but it will likely be reintroduced during the
coming year.
A. The Bill's Terms
Though the amendments added by the Judiciary Committee increased the
complexity of the Campbell Bill, the bill still contains only one basic
proposition: Doctors (and other health care professionals) are permitted to
engage in collective bargaining with health plans. The central provision of the
bill is therefore Section 2(a):
Any health care professionals who are engaged in negotiations with a health
plan regarding the terms of any contract under which the professionals provide
health care items or services for which benefits are provided under such plan
shall, in connection with such negotiations, be entitled to the same treatment
under the antitrust laws as the treatment to which bargaining units which are
recognized under the National Labor Relations Act are entitled in connection
with such collective bargaining. Such a professional shall, only in connection
with such negotiations, be treated as an employee engaged in concerted
activities and shall not be regarded as having the status of an employer,
independent contractor, managerial employee, or supervisor. 7
In short, the bill would override existing antitrust law (price fixing) and
labor law (independent contractor and supervisor/managerial employee issues)
limitations on collective bargaining for health care professionals in their
contract negotiations with health plans. Through the use of a legal fiction
declaring that a doctor shall not be considered an "employer, independent
74. H.R. 1304, 106th Cong. § 2(a) (2000).
75. According to The Washington Post, Speaker Hastert had intended to bring the bill
to a vote after it passed the committee, but "business lobbyists asked that the vote be delayed
so they could marshal their forces to defeat it." Juliet Eilperin, House Leaders Pull Bill to
Let Doctors Bargain Collectively, WASH. PosT, May 26, 2000, at AS.
76. Doctors May Get HMO Clout, ORLANDo SENTrNEL, July 1, 2000, at A6.
77. H.R. 1304, § 2(a). "Health care professional" is defined as follows: "an individual
who provides health care items or services, treatment, assistance with activities of daily
living, or medications to patients and who, to the extent required by State or Federal law,
possesses specialized training that confers expertise in the provision of such items or
services, treatment, assistance, or medications." Id. § 20)(3).
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contractor, managerial employee, or supervisor," 78 the bill extends the labor
exception to antitrust law, making it applicable to doctors. The bill is careful to
limit its scope, however, to contract negotiations. It would not permit doctors
associated with health plans to form full-service labor unions in the traditional
sense-unions that would be able to bargain continuously with health plans for
better working conditions or act as mediators for workplace disputes.7 9 In
addition, the bill expressly prohibits striking by health care professionals,
except where permitted by existing law.8 0
Several significant features were added to the bill as it moved through the
Judiciary Committee. Two provisions, in particular, drastically cut back on the
reach of the original bill. First, the Committee approved a three-year sunset
provision limiting the exemption provided by the bill to a three-year trial period
unless reenacted by Congress. 8 1 Secondly, the Committee added a section
providing that the exemption will not apply to contract negotiations that pertain
to benefits provided under Medicaid, Medicare, and several other federal
programs.8 2 This latter provision might prove difficult to enforce in practice.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found that-with the exception of
Medicare-it would be difficult for health plans to separate services provided
for federal programs from other services when setting contract terms.8 3 The
CBO also suggests that attempting to define the meaning of this exception
would produce a significant amount of litigation.8 4 Overall, the changes made
to H.R. 1304 while in committee limited the potential scope of the bill but also
added significantly to its complexity.8 5
78. Id. § 2(a).
79. The bill includes an explicit limitation on its scope: "Nothing in this section shall
exempt from the application of the antitrust laws any agreement or otherwise unlawful
conspiracy that excludes, limits the participation or reimbursement of, or otherwise limits the
scope of services to be provided by any health care professional ... with respect to the
performance of services that are within their scope ofpractice .... ." Id. § 2(e).
80. Id. § 2(c)(1) ("The exemption provided in [§ 2(a)] shall not confer any new right to
participate in any collective cessation of service to patients not already permitted by existing
law.").
81. Id. § 2(d). In the third year of this period, the bill calls for a General Accounting
Office study to evaluate the effects of the exemption and to recommend whether or not it
should be extended. Id. § 2(i).
82. Id. § 2(g).
83. Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate for H.R. 1304 (May 17, 2000),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/cost.shtml [hereinafter Cost Estimate] (discussing the
"Effect on Federal Revenues and Direct Spending"). The CBO adds that if H.R. 1304
produces substantial changes in market rates for medical services or in utilization practices,
government programs will not be able to insulate themselves from these effects. Id.
84. Id. For example, does the exception apply to any contract that may involve a
federal program, or does it only apply to contracts that are specifically limited to health care
services for a particular federal program?
85. Two additional amendments were added to the bill on the House floor. One was
an "antiabortion amendment designed to prevent doctors from forcing insurers to provide
coverage for abortions." Matthew Vita, House Approves AMA-Backed Bill; Proposal Allows
Group Bargaining with Insurers, WASH. POST, July 1, 2000, at AS. This amendment, which
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B. The Bill's Intent
All of the statements from Rep. Campbell, the AMA, and other supporters
of H.R. 1304 have focused on two anticipated effects of the bill: its impact on
the relative bargaining power between HMOs and physicians, and its effect on
the quality of health care. First, as discussed above, proponents of the bill
argue that it is needed to "level the playing field between HMOs and health
care providers." 86 According to the AMA, the need for antitrust "relief' is
obvious.87 As Ratcliffe Anderson, the CEO of the AMA, testified before
Congress: "In many markets, physicians have virtually no bargaining power
with dominant health plans that refuse to negotiate any terms of their
contracts-including terms with important patient care implications. As a
result, plans present physicians with non-negotiable contract terms that no
businessperson with any bargaining power would agree to."'8 8 By permitting
doctors to bargain collectively, the bill is intended to "ensure that all health-
care professionals will be able to secure contracts of a fair and equitable
nature."'89 When discussing what is "fair and equitable," however, supporters
are careful to make no mention of improving physicians' incomes. The
potential for higher fees, however, is clearly an additional factor motivating the
AMA and other physician organizations to support the bill.
In addition to their arguments for increased bargaining leverage, supporters
of the Campbell Bill argue that physicians-when they are able to negotiate
collectively-will use their strengthened position to force HMOs to improve
patient care. According to Rep. Campbell, "First on the list of contractual
terms that health-care professionals will demand is a greater right to prescribe
and care for patients in the proper medical terms, allowing professionals to
practice their professions." 90 The AMA adds, "[E]stablishing an effective
approach to negotiations [through collective bargaining] is a good way to help
passed by a narrow margin, states, "Nothing in this [bill] shall apply to negotiations
specifically relating to requiring a health plan to cover abortion or abortion services." H.R.
1304, § 2(h). A second amendment, offered by Rep. Danny Davis (D-IL), added that "[i]t is
the sense of the Congress that decisions regarding medical care and treatment should be
made by the physician or health care professional in consultation with the patient." Id. §
2(k). This symbolic amendment did not make any substantive alteration to the bill.
86. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
87. See American Medical Association, Statement on Antitrust Relief, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/basic/Category/0, 1060,201,00.htm [hereinafter Antitrust
Relief] (last visited Dec. 3, 2000).
88. Hearings, supra note 21, at 151. For examples of such terms, see notes 32-35
supra and accompanying text. Rep. Conyers, in an address to a national meeting of the
AMA, gave another example of the bargaining power of HMOs: "Doctors, in present-day
working conditions, can be called in by an HMO and told they have 30 days to join a
medical plan and that if they don't sign the contract, they can't ever join again." Nancy
McVicar, Doctors May Get Right to Bargain, SUN-SENTINEL (FT. LAUDERDALE), Mar. 28,
2000, at 3A.
89. Campbell, supra note 2.
90. Id.
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assure that the tension between cost and quality considerations is ultimately
resolved to the benefit of the patients." 9 1
These contentions of the bill's supporters are, of course, debatable. While
Rep. Campbell asserts that his bill would "improv[e] the quality of health care
for all Americans," 92 the New York Times concludes that "the [physician]
cartels envisioned by Mr. Campbell would victimize consumers. '93
The remainder of this note will compare these drastically different views of
the bill's consequences if enacted. I conclude the following: 1) that H.R. 1304
is an uncertain method for improving health care quality; 2) that "leveling the
playing field" is not necessary under today's market conditions; and 3) that
enactment of H.R. 1304 would likely lead to higher health care costs. Before
reaching these conclusions, however, I first turn to the preliminary question of
whether doctors would in fact bargain collectively if given the opportunity do
SO.
IV. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF H.R. 1304
A. Would Doctors Act Collectively?
If doctors did not take advantage of the collective bargaining powers
granted to them by H.R. 1304, the effects of the bill on the health care market
might not be substantial. And there is some evidence to suggest that organizing
collective action among doctors might be a difficult task. Grace Budrys, a
strong advocate of collective action by doctors, reluctantly concludes at the end
of her book When Doctors Join Unions that mass collective organization by
physicians is not on the immediate horizon. She writes:
I will not predict that doctors will be joining unions in large numbers in the
near future. As the drop in AMA membership since its Golden Age clearly
indicates, doctors have not exhibited much interest in developing a collective
stance. The majority have been slow to take action to challenge their new and
dissatisfying conditions of work. So far, the most notable action doctors have
taken in any significant number is joining together into increasingly bigger
practice groups.9 4
There are several potential barriers to collective action by doctors. The
first is their traditional sense of individualism that is grounded in both
practicality and professional ethics. As a practical matter, more than eighty
91. Hearings, supra note 21, at 152 (statement of E. Ratcliffe Anderson, CEO, AMA).
92. Congressman Tom Campbell, Campbell/Conyers Health Care Coalition Act Passes
House Judiciary Committee 26-2 (Mar. 31, 2000) (press release), available at
http://www.house.gov/campbell/00033l.htm.
93. A Cartelfor Doctors, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8,2000, at A12.
94. BUDRYS, supra note 28, at 153.
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percent of self:employed doctors work in groups of nine or fewer.95
Organizing collective action by doctors who practice separately-and also
competitively-would be a massive organizational task for whatever group
assumes the challenge.
Even if organizational obstacles could be overcome, it is not clear that
doctors are interested in collective action. As Budrys writes, "Given the
American value system, physicians' unions in the United States face a major
contradiction in calling for collective action. Collective action promises
collective gain, which is inconsistent with the dominant social ideology.
Individual worth in this society is measured in terms of individual achievement
and individual solutions. ' 96  This reverence for individuality may be
particularly strong among doctors, who spend many years of hard work in
study and preparation for their profession.97
Doctors are also concerned that collective bargaining might be viewed as
"unprofessional." In the United States, unions and collective bargaining are
popularly associated with industrial workers and government employees. 98
Physicians, already concerned that the HMO era has eroded their professional
status, may be wary of taking action that could be construed as compromising
their professionalism.99 In the AMA's report entitled Risk Assessment of
Forming an AMA Affiliated Collective Bargaining Unit,1 00 one section of the
report is specifically devoted to the impact that collective bargaining might
have on the AMA's professionalism. The report concludes:
Professionalism is a founding and enduring concept for the AMA, and is
central to its vision and strategic plan. Would the formation of [collective
bargaining units] enhance, detract from, or have no effect on the AMA as a
professional association, or on physicians as a "profession"? The [collective
95. REPORT 30, supra note 63, app. C at 53.
96. BuDRYs, supra note 28, at 30. This ethic of individualism can be contrasted with
the prevailing social ideology in other countries where collective action by doctors is the
norm. See id. at 4, 28.
97. See John G. Day, Managed Care and the Medical Profession: Old Issues and Old
Tensions: The Building Blocks of Tomorrow's Health Care Delivery and Financing System,
3 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 58 (1996-1997) (noting that "physicians have been conditioned to
operate independently").
98. In 1999, only 11% of union members were employed in the service sector
(excluding government). Most union members were employed by the government (43%) or
worked in manufacturing (18%). AFL-CIO, Union Difference: Union Members by Industry,
1999 (Jan. 2000), available at http://www.aflcio.org/uniondifference/uniondifflO.htm.
99. For example, Dr. Jerome Kassirer, editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of
Medicine, has stated:
[M~y chief concern (is] that unionizing could further degrade the perception of medicine as a
learned profession governed by high ethical standards. Because collective bargaining
inevitably focuses on income, the self-interest of physicians-not ideal patient care---could
be seen as a dominant focus of the profession. We have seen repeatedly that open bickering
by unions about money can engender the disdain, if not the wrath, of the public. Do we want
to be the next target?
Jerome P. Kassirer, The Wrong Prescription, BOSTON GLOBE, July 2, 1999, at A 19.
100. REPORT 30, supra note 63, app. Eat 56.
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bargaining unit] proposal [as well as H.R. 1304] explicitly rules out the strike
as a tool [and] declares the code of medical ethics as fundamental principles
that must be honored. It strongly states that never compromising patient
interest, the most fundamental requirement of professionalism, would be
vigorously adhered to. These dimensions of the [proposal] are there to protect
professionalism. If they are adhered to, and the interests of patients are placed
in a paramount position so that they are never compromised, professionalism
would be protected. 10 1
As this passage indicates, the AMA's key concern is whether participation
in collective bargaining would signal to the public that doctors were putting
their own concerns ahead of their patients' interests. As the report summarizes,
"The bottom line on professionalism comes down to a question of whether
there is or is not a fundamental inconsistency between professionalism and
being 'a labor organization.' 1 02 The recent vote by the AMA membership-
the premier "professional" organization of physicians-in favor of developing
an affiliated national labor organization seems to suggest, however, that
concerns about professionalism may not be an insurmountable obstacle to
collective action. 103
An additional barrier to collective action is that doctors-for both legal and
ethical reasons-would be unable to avail themselves of the ultimate
bargaining tool of unions: the strike. H.R 1304 expressly prohibits striking by
health care professionals as a negotiating tactic, and the AMA, as noted above,
is also opposed to using work stoppages to accomplish desired ends.104 One
might then question whether collective action could be at all effective without a
credible threat of a strike. The meaning of the work "strike," however,
becomes murky when applied to the new terrain of independent contractors. If
doctors affiliated with a particular health plan (as independent contractors, not
employees) decided en masse to refuse new contracts with that organization
unless better contract terms were offered, would that be a strike? As
independent contractors, their actions might be legally differentiable from a
strike-but the effects would be the same. 105 This leaves doctors with difficult
101. Id. at56-57.
102. Id. at 57.
103. See American Medical Association, AMA Physicians Vote to Form National
Negotiating Organization (June 23, 1999) (press release), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/meetings/public/annual99/990623.htm.
104. Dr. Randolph D. Smoak, Jr., Chair of the AMA Board of Trustees, has flatly
stated: 'Doctors will not strike or endanger patient care. We will follow the principles of
medical ethics every step of the way." Id.
105. In his statement before the House Judiciary Committee, FTC Chairman Robert
Pitofsky made the following criticism of the Campbell Bill:
[A]lthough the current bill excludes the "collective cessation of service to patients" from its
protections, this limitation takes virtually nothing away from the coercive power the bill
grants to providers. The bill continues to pernit physicians and others to collectively refuse
to deal with a health plan that refuses their demands for higher fees. If a plan failed to accede
to those demands, and the group refused to contract, the plan could be forced from the
market, or patients would be left to pay their medical bills out of their own pockets. Thus,
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legal and ethical issues to work out before entering into collective negotiations.
Even though doctors might not naturally tend to act collectively, and even
though the constraints of "professionalism" might limit their options, doctors
are clearly more willing to consider collective action than they have been in the
past. To cite one example, doctors who are permitted by current antitrust laws
to unionize have been doing so at an increasing rate. From 1996 to 1999, the
number of unionized physicians increased by over 10,000, and "the number of
doctors in unions is expected by labor experts to grow by 15 percent or more
each year."106 The AMA's vote to organize an affiliated collective bargaining
unit-as well as the AMA's aggressive support of H.R. 1304-also indicates
an increased willingness among doctors to consider working collectively. How
successful their collective action will be, however, remains to be seen.
B. Possible Consequences of Collective Action by Doctors
1. Health care quality.
If doctors were to utilize the collective bargaining powers of H.R. 1304,
would such collective action be a successful remedy for the problems that
concern them? As a strategy for improving health care quality, collective
bargaining certainly seems unusual. The Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission have highlighted this fact when framing their opposition to
the bill. For example, FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky testified before the
House Judiciary Committee as follows:
[T]his extension of the labor exemption is being offered as a way to remedy
matters that collective bargaining was never intended to address. The stated
goal of this bill is to promote the quality of patient care. The labor exemption,
however, was not created to solve issues regarding the ultimate quality of
products or services that consumers receive. Collective bargaining rights are
designed to raise the incomes and improve working conditions of union
members. The law protects the United Auto Workers' right to bargain for
higher wages and better working conditions, but we do not rely on the UAW
to bargain for safer cars. Congress addressed those concerns in other ways.
The patient care issues raised by supporters of the bill deserve serious
attention, but an ill-fitting labor exemption is the wrong approach.107
On the other hand, the market for health care is significantly different from
the market for cars. Most importantly, people cannot purchase health care
directly from their health plans-physicians (or other health care professionals)
are required intermediaries. Since most people are likely to follow the health
although providers could not collectively refuse to treat patients, their collective refusal to
contract with a plan could impose formidable financial obstacles to patients seeking care.
Hearings, supra note 21, at 45.
106. See Greenhouse, supra note 26.
107. Hearings, supra note 21, at 46.
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care suggestions of their doctors, the policies under which the doctors operate
become critically important. Short of regulating the medical policies of health
care plans directly-which has also been proposed 1 0 8-- enhancing the ability of
doctors to negotiate changes in those policies on their patients' behalf might be
one of the only ways to ensure that the patients' interests are adequately
represented when these policies are set.109
However, as Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein points out, "The
proposed bill makes no attempt to distinguish between joint negotiations by
health care professionals that are designed to enhance efficiency, reduce costs
and improve quality of care and those designed simply to increase the
providers' income." 110  There is no guarantee--outside of unenforceable
promises-that doctors would use their increased power to focus on contract
terms that would lead to better quality outcomes. Even when negotiating
collectively, doctors would not be able to force all desired concessions out of
HMOs-they would presumably have to compromise at some point. Given
that the quality-of-care measures that doctors might propose are likely to be
more expensive, HMOs might demand that any increases in health care costs be
drawn from money that would otherwise go to the doctors' salaries. This
would put the doctors in a difficult moral bind-and it would be impossible to
determine how various groups of doctors would react to this type of
situation. 1 11
Indeed, Dr. Fitzhugh Mullan recalls being put in such a difficult position
when bargaining on behalf of a union of medical interns and residents in the
1970s. According to Mullan:
Our team was made up of activists determined to make the [bargaining unit]
an instrument of patient-care improvement in the city's generally second-rate
and largely ignored public hospitals.... Eventually, the city... craftily split
our ranks by offering generous salary increases in return for dropping the
108. Indeed, regulation of managed care plans has been a hot political topic in the past
year, and was an important issue in the 2000 elections. "Patients' Bill of Rights" plans
passed both the House and the Senate this year, but in strikingly different forms. For
example, "[t]he House bill would cover all privately insured patients, while the Senate
version would cover less than one-third of them." Helen Dewar, Hill Republican Leaders
Struggle for Patients' Rights Deal; GOP Rebel May Scuttle Compromise, WASH. PosT, June
24, 2000, at A10. The two chambers failed to agree on a compromise plan during the 106th
Congress.
109. An additional fact that differentiates the health care market from other markets is
the fact that many people do not select their health care plans directly-their employers
select them.
110. Hearings, supra note 21, at 75 (statement of Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice).
111. One commentator notes that doctors are not necessarily competent to be forceful
advocates for patients. In his view, "those [patients] seeking 'advocacy' in a health care
system increasingly beset by conflict over the allocation of financial resources have a more
adversarial construct in mind than physicians typically envision. In short, they are looking
for a lawyer." William M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates, 35 Hous. L. REv. 1529, 1530
(1999).
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patient-care demands. When push came to shove, the average resident
working an 80-hour week and trying to get home for supper occasionally was
quite happy to take the pay increase and call it square. 112
Based on this past experience, Dr. Mullan is unconvinced that today's
physician leaders would be able to resist the temptation to accept similar
deals.1 1 3
In addition, even if doctors were to advocate only on behalf of their
patients, the health care decisions doctors would make might often differ from
the decisions patients would make for themselves. 114 While doctors, given
their training, presumably put a premium on quality of care, some consumers
might be willing to accept lower quality care in return for lower costs. The
theory behind antitrust law is that consumers should be permitted to make this
type of decision; if they are strongly concerned about quality-of-care issues, the
market should respond without any additional pressure from doctors. 115 In
FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, for example, the Supreme Court wrote
that the antitrust laws did not permit a group of dentists to "pre-empt the
working of the market by deciding for itself that its customers do not need that
which they demand." 1 6 The Court went on to note that market forces would
push insurance companies to provide the mix of cost and quality that patients
demand, and it is "by no means clear that they lack incentives to consider the
112. Fitzhugh Mullan, A Look at ... Unionizing Doctors; I Joined Once. Now I'm Not
So Sure, WAsH. PosT, July 18, 1999, at B3.
113. H.R. 1304 presents a second health care quality issue as well. Doctors could also
use their collective bargaining power to "severely limit the ability of managed-care plans to
second-guess doctors who practice bad medicine." Weinstein, supra note 68. Indeed,
doctors might negotiate with HMOs to block the utilization review practices that managed
care organizations use both to control quality and to restrain costs.
114. See Hearings, supra note 21, at 44 (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman,
FTC) ("The collective judgment of health care professionals concerning what patients should
want can differ markedly from what patients themselves are asking for in the marketplace.").
115. The AMA complains that the FTC and DOJ "assume erroneously that the health
plans are stand-ins for patients and they seem to imply that patients will only benefit from
lower costs generated as a result of efficiencies, without regard to potential quality issues
that may arise." Hearings, supra note 21, at 169 (statement of E. Ratcliffe Anderson, CEO,
AMA). This is a mischaracterization, however. The antitrust enforcement agencies argue
that consumers should have a choice to benefit from lower costs that result from efficiencies.
If they choose to pass over less expensive plans in return for other types of benefits (e.g., a
greater emphasis on quality or an ability to see more doctors), they should be able to find
those options in the market.
116. 476 U.S. 447, 462 (1986). In the case, a group of dentists conspired to withhold
patient x-rays from dental insurers so that the insurers would not be able to review their
treatment decisions. Id. at 455. They argued that since treatment reviews by insurance
companies were leading to inadequate patient care, their actions in withholding the
information were not motivated by anticompetitive justifications. Id. at 462-63. The Court
stated that the doctors' argument amounted to a claim that consumers should be denied
certain choices because they might "make unwise or even dangerous decisions." Id. at 463.
Such an argument, the Court wrote, was "nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic
policy of the Sherman Act." Id. (quoting National Soc'y of Prof I Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (internal quotations omitted)).
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welfare of the patient as well as the minimization of costs. 11 7
In short, collective bargaining is an indirect and unconventional way to
address issues of patient care, and its indirect nature means that it is also much
less likely to be successful. As one physician has put it, "Collective bargaining
is ideally suited to negotiations about money and working conditions; it is not
an effective tool to improve the quality of goods and services." 118 And even if
collective bargaining could produce improvements in the quality of care, the
inevitable result would be higher prices for consumers. As the Supreme Court
held in Indiana Federation of Dentists, the choice to make such a trade-off
should be left to consumers; providers should not make it for them.119 If
doctors are convinced that consumers care more about quality of care than they
care about cost control, they should test that assertion in the market by offering
a new product (as some doctors have begun to do through IPAs). Unless the
bargaining power of IMOs would make this alternative course of action
impossible-and, as discussed below, I do not believe it would--enactment of
H.R. 1304 would constitute an unwarranted intervention into a health care
market that is still undergoing substantial evolution.
2. Bargaining power.
As outlined above, considerable debate exists as to whether there is
currently a significant disparity in bargaining power between health plans and
physicians. This is a crucially important factual question, because if such a
disparity in bargaining power does not presently exist, the effect of H.R. 1304
would be to give doctors undue leverage over health plans. The New York
Times, for example, has suggested that this would be the case, editorializing
that the Campbell Bill would "invite doctors to ... jack up prices, boycott
health plans and exploit consumers in ways that are permitted to no other
independent businessmen in the economy."12 0
Supporters of the bill contend that H.R. 1304 is needed to level the playing
field between HMOs and doctors. According to the AMA, HMOs have already
achieved significant leverage over their physicians in many markets. As Dr.
Anderson of the AMA summarized before Congress:
In past years when patients had more choice among health plans, physicians
could choose the kind of health plan in which they participated. Physicians
117. Id. The Court saw no reason to consider the market for dental services to be
fundamentally different from other markets, despite the presence of third-party payers.
Insurance companies are "themselves in competition for the patronage of the patients... and
must satisfy their potential customers not only that they will provide coverage at a
reasonable cost, but also that that coverage will be adequate to meet their customers' dental
needs." Id. Presumably, the Court would say the same thing about markets for other
medical services.
118. Kassirer, supra note 99.
119. See notes 116-117 supra and accompanying text.
120. A Cartelfor Doctors, supra note 93.
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did not have to contract with health plans that enforced medical policies that
they did not agree with. However, when health plans become significant in
terms of size, the stakes become too high for physicians to refuse to sign a
contract.... While it is unclear at precisely what point physicians cannot
afford to "just say no" to onerous contract terms, if a plan represents as little
as 20% of a physician's practice, it is extremely difficult to walk away from a
contract.... In addition to losing a portion of income that a small business
cannot afford to forego, more importantly, it means disrupting or severing
patient relationships. 12 1
The AMA believes that HMOs are currently exercising this market power to
impose onerous contract terms on doctors, to the ultimate detriment of their
patients. 122
Despite the AMA's arguments-and its accurate identification of a
troublesome trend of mergers among health plans12 3-the opponents of H.R.
1304 have marshaled an impressive amount of statistical evidence
demonstrating that HMOs do not have excessive market power over physicians,
at least in the vast majority of markets. In fact, the Antitrust Coalition for
Consumer Choice in Health Care used the AMA's own numbers against it
when arguing before Congress that the financial pressure exerted on physicians
by HMOs is not excessive:
[A]s reported in the AMA's most recent survey, managed care, of all
varieties, and in the aggregate, accounts for only 48.7% of nonfederal
physician revenue. Of this amount, 29.9% is from private managed care,
11.1% from Medicare managed care, and 6.7% from Medicaid managed care.
It must be emphasized, moreover, that this figure includes income from
HMOs, PPOs and POS arrangements, and covers all health plans combined.
Obviously, the revenue share from HMOs would be much less, as would the
share from any single plan. 124
Using these numbers, the Coalition concluded that "[i]t is unlikely that the
share of any single health plan even remotely approaches that of a monopsony
in any area of the country."12 5 The Coalition also cites a 1998 study of
managed care in the nation's twenty largest market areas. The study found that
121. Hearings, supra note 21, at 158. See also Jeremy Lutsky, Is Your Physician
Becoming a Teamster: The Rising Trend of Physicians Joining Labor Unions in the Late
1990s, 2 DEPAuL J. HEALTH CARE L. 55, 57 (1997) ("Insurance companies, with the
bargaining power of their total membership, can essentially force physicians to accept the
insurance companies' fee schedules or risk losing patients."). Other than anecdotal
evidence, however, Lutsky presents no data to support this conclusion.
122. See notes 29-35 supra and accompanying text
123. Citing a rash of recent health plan mergers, the AMA concludes that
"[c]onsolidation pervades the current health care marketplace." Hearings, supra note 21, at
155 (statement of E. Ratcliffe Anderson, CEO, AMA). While these mergers are potentially
harmful to consumers, the more straightforward solution would be aggressive enforcement
of existing antitrust laws.
124. Hearings, supra note 21, at 254 (statement of Bill Jones on behalf of the Antitrust
Coalition for Consumer Choice in Health Care).
125. Id.
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compared to the overall market population, the percentage of enrollees in the
largest HMO was under twenty percent of the general population in all but two
cases, and often under ten percent. 126
Testifying before Congress, Joel Klein of the DOJ's Antitrust Division
refuted the argument that health plan consolidation has given HMOs dominant
market positions:
The relative bargaining power of plans and providers varies tremendously
among markets. Although there have been several mergers of health plans
over the last few years, in our view there still exists a significant number of
competing health insurance plans, none of which dominates, and there has
been new entry into various local markets. Between 1994 and 1997 over 150
new HMOs were licensed across the country. Moreover, over the last decade,
as enrollment in managed care plans has grown, the market shares of many
once-dominant Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans has eroded, resulting in
decreasing, rather than increasing, concentration among health insurers in
certain markets.127
Robert Pitofsky of the FTC confirms this view, noting, "[T]he evidence does
not support the suggestion that most (or even many) areas have only one or two
health plans."'1 28 Instead of balancing the playing field, Pitofsky argues, H.R.
1304 would "permit doctors to create monopolies." 129
Even if a few HMOs are dominant in particular markets, the Campbell
Bill's "broad brush approach" would apply to all health care markets. 130 H.R.
1304 has no mechanism to limit its scope to the few markets that are dominated
by one or two health plan providers. Instead, it would significantly augment
the market power of doctors in all markets, even though most doctors already
have the ability to "avoid doing business with a plan they do not like. '131 Such
a rigid approach appears especially inappropriate for an industry that is still
fluctuating considerably.
In addition to the relatively healthy market structure of most health care
markets, the antitrust laws already allow doctors to collaborate in various ways
that increase their market power.1 32 As previously noted, physicians can merge
their practices, form joint ventures, or establish their own health care networks
(IPAs), provided that they follow the FTC/DOJ guidelines. 133 Physicians-
through groups like the AMA-are also permitted to "freely dispens[e]
126. Id. at 254 & fig.4. The two metropolitan areas where the leading HMO's
enrollment was more than 20% of the total market were Pittsburgh, where Keystone Health
Plan had a 38.9% share, and San Francisco, where the Kaiser Health Plan had a 26.5% share.
Id.
127. Hearings, supra note 21, at 75.
128. Id. at 50.
129. Id.
130. Greaney, supra note 51, at 401.
131. A Cartelfor Doctors, supra note 93.
132. See Greaney, supra note 51, at 400-01.
133. See notes 53-57 supra and accompanying text
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information about the quality of HMOs or... advocat[e] legislation to correct
abuses. ' 13 4 Likewise, physicians can engage in collective discussions with
health plans regarding patient care issues: "Among other things, physicians
may collectively explain to a health plan why they think a particular policy or
practice is medically unsound, and may present medical or scientific data to
support their views. ' 135
Furthermore, there is a developing trend towards the consolidation of
physician practices. The continuation of such a trend would further obviate the
need for legislation such as H.R. 1304. As one commentator explains:
By 1997, 44 percent of all self-employed nonfederal physicians were engaged
in group practice, with the number of group practices increasing by 362
percent between 1965 (4,289 groups) and 1996 (19,820 groups). As this trend
continues and an increasing number of physicians abandon solo practice and
become employees of group practices, oftentimes with equity stakes, virtual
collective bargaining units will be created. Moreover, as these groups affiliate
with one another and leverage forces and resources through independent
practice associations and similar arrangements-the functional equivalents of
unions-their collective bargaining power will potentially become
formidable. 136
Such a group arrangement may not be the ideal for doctors used to
practicing independently. Nonetheless, many doctors view physician networks
as an alternative to HMOs that allows them to deal directly with patients and to
retake responsibility for their own medical decisions. 137 Indeed, these evolving
physician networks appear to be the market's response to the frustrations that
many physicians are experiencing with liMOs. Rather than short-circuiting the
development of these alternative forms of health care provision-as H.R. 1304
would likely do-lawmakers and antitrust enforcers should encourage their
development. As we have heard repeatedly during the past year, antitrust law
is not only concerned with preventing excess market power, it is also designed
to encourage innovation. 138
134. Greaney, supra note 51, at 400.
135. Hearings, supra note 21, at 52 (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, FTC).
136. Scheffler, supra note 31, at 1074 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also
Day, supra note 97, at 28 ("[P]rovider networks-while still in their infancy-seem to be
aimed at building the capacity to contract directly with public and private payers and to by-
pass the traditional insurance or HMO 'middleman.").
137. See Day, supra note 97, at 43.
138. I am, of course, referring to the many public statements from the Justice
Department regarding its case against Microsoft Corp. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Statements Regarding Proposed Remedy in Microsoft Case (Apr. 28, 2000) (press release),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2000/4646.htm ("Our proposal
will stimulate competition, promote innovation, and give consumers new and better choices
in the marketplace.").
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3. Cost.
The primary objection of the antitrust enforcement agencies to the
Campbell Bill is that it would raise costs for consumers. Joel Klein states the
Justice Department's position in unequivocal terms:
The bill's potential adverse economic impact on consumers is large. Our
investigations reveal that when health care professionals jointly negotiate with
health insurers, without regard to antitrust laws, they typically seek to
significantly increase their fees, sometimes by as much as 20-40%....
Exempting such joint activity through enactment of H.R. 1304 would permit
health care professionals to negotiate and effectuate such increases in
countless markets throughout the country. In view of the size of expenditures
for health care services and the large number of patients receiving care, the
potential anticompetitive costs that would be borne by consumers are large.13 9
The Justice Department also has some telling anecdotal evidence to back up its
point. For example, a group of twenty-nine Florida physicians recently
negotiated collectively (in violation of current antitrust rules) and succeeded in
getting health plans to raise their salaries by as much as thirty percent in some
cases before the Justice Department filed an antitrust suit. 140
The Federal Trade Commission suggests that the Campbell Bill could
produce a chain reaction of events that could significantly harm consumers.
First, the FTC suggests that doctors would use their new negotiating powers to
command higher fees for themselves and higher-cost services for their patients.
Health plans would then react by passing these expenses on to consumers-in
the form of higher insurance premiums and higher out-of-pocket expenses.
These price increases, in turn, could raise the number of people without health
insurance, thus forcing Medicaid programs that utilize managed care plans to
increase their budgets or reduce services. 14 1
Supporting the position of the DOJ and the FTC, the Congressional Budget
Office released a report in May (upon the order of the House Judiciary
Committee) predicting the estimated cost of H.R. 1304.142 The CBO estimated
that the cost to the federal government would be approximately $6.5 billion
139. Hearings, supra note 21, at 77.
140. Id. at 76-77; see also Sarah A. Klein, Justice Dept. Slaps Florida Physicians with
Antitrust Charges, AM. MED. NEws, Feb. 15, 1999, available at http://www.ana-
assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick.99/pickO2l5.htm (relating the details of the case).
141. See Hearings, supra note 21, at 47-48 (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman,
FTC); ef House Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, AMA Vote Endorsing the
Unionization of Doctors is Bad Medicine (June 24, 1999) (press release), available at
http://www.house.gov/edworkforce/press/jabhc62499.htm (quoting Rep. John Boehner (R-
OH) as predicting that "increased costs from unionizing would certainly be passed on to
consumers, raising premiums and hurting the people we should be helping most: the 43
million Americans without health insurance"). As noted above, even with section 2(g) of the
bill, it is unlikely that Medicaid and other federal programs would remain unaffected by the
bill. See notes 82-84 supra and accompanying text
142. Cost Estimate, supra note 83.
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over ten years (assuming that the bill is reenacted after the three-year sunset
period), and that annual national expenditures on private health insurance
would rise by almost 2.6%.143 The basis for all of the CBO's predictions is its
assumption that "doctors who join an effective coalition would secure an
increase in fees averaging 15 percent." 144 The CBO also predicted that the
physician coalitions would succeed in easing tight utilization controls by
HMOs, and the result would be a further increase in health insurance prices.
The report states:
[U]tilization management [by HMOs to restrict the number of services
performed] now yields about a 5 percent savings compared to indemnity
insurance. CBO estimates that 50 percent of the utilization savings associated
with coalition physicians [i.e., those who would take advantage of H.R. 1304's
collective bargaining powers] who contract with those managed care plans
would be lost as a result of the bill. The increase in [provision of services] by
coalition physicians would raise private health expenditures by 0.3 percent if
the antitrust exemption were permanent. 145
By increasing fees paid to physicians and causing additional services to be
provided and used, the bill would result in higher insurance premiums. The
increase will be passed on to the government and the public in several ways.
First, as the CBO predicts, some companies will pass along the costs to
employees in the form of reduced compensation or fringe benefits. 146 This in
turn reduces income tax revenue for the government. Secondly, direct
spending by the government on health care is likely to increase, despite the
bill's attempts to limit its application to federal programs. 147 Finally, firms
might simply react to higher premiums by reducing plan coverage or
purchasing plans with higher deductibles and co-payments for their employees.
In response to these criticisms, Rep. Campbell, the AMA, and other
physician groups strongly dispute any dire predictions that H.R. 1304 would
lead to higher prices for consumers. Rep. Campbell has asserted that any
increases in fees paid to doctors would be absorbed by the health plans and not
passed on to consumers. 148 However, there does not seem to be any strong
143. Id.
144. Id. The CBO added, however, that "[o]nly a fraction of all physicians would
become members of such coalitions." Id.
145. Id. The report also notes that an increased menu of services made available to
patients by coalition physicians would likely affect the practice of other doctors, as
"physicians usually adhere to the norms of practice established by their peers." Id.
146. Cost Estimate, supra note 83 (estimating that about one percent of additional
private health insurance costs would be passed on in the form of decreased compensation
other than health benefits).
147. See notes 82-84 supra and accompanying text
148. More specifically, Rep. Campbell's assertion is that doctors will use their
bargaining power to force HMOs to operate more efficiently, thus offsetting any cost
increases. See Jay Thomas Rex, Bill Aimed at Fighting HMOs; Bargaining Rights Given to
Doctors by Proposal, ARLINGTON MORNING NEws, Mar. 28, 2000, at IC. Rep. Campbell
appeared to back off of this prediction, however, as the vote on H.R. 1304 approached.
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empirical basis for this assumption, which flies in the face of the basic
economic premise that increases in the price of any input will raise the price of
the final product.' 4 9  In addition, Rep. Campbell's assertions are flatly
contradicted by the CBO report.1 50 Siding with Campbell, however, the AMA
has also attacked the "artful assumptions" of the CBO, claiming that it "defies
basic economics" to assume that physicians will be able to secure average
increases of fifteen percent from payers with large market shares.1 5 1 Many of
the AMA's arguments, however, are based on the premise that physicians will
not be very effective at collective bargaining. For example, the AMA argues:
The [CBO's] assumptions reflect a lack of understanding of the independent
nature of the physician community. Basic laws of supply and demand will
limit the ability of physicians to negotiate higher fees. Again, physicians who
are not employees are not traditional "labor"; they are independent
contractors-small business men and women! 152
The AMA's talking points also include the argument that physician coalitions
will be less effective than traditional labor unions because they lack the power
to strike. 153 If it is true that collective bargaining by physicians will be only
moderately effective, then the AMA's enthusiastic advocacy of the bill seems
difficult to understand.
Overall, the opponents of H.R. 1304 have the better side of the cost debate:
The measure would indeed be costly. Even if physicians only use their
When debating the bill on the House floor, Campbell stated, "If you want better quality of
medicine, it might be that you have to pay for it." Nick Anderson, Collective Bargainingfor
Doctors Gains, L.A. TIMEs, June 30, 2000, at A24. Rep. Campbell's alternate argument is
that H.R. 1304 is a cheaper alternative to direct regulation of HMOs though a "patients' bill
of rights." See Bill Ainsworth, House Bill Would Aid Doctors in HMO Fight; U.S. Senate
Hopeful Campbell in Spotlight, SAN DIEGO UmoN-TRM., June 4, 2000, at A3. This was the
line of argument that Rep. Campbell pressed in his second U.S. Senate debate with Sen.
Dianne Feinstein. See Recording of U.S. Senate Debate Between Sen. Dianne Feinstein and
Rep. Tom Campbell (Oct. 27, 2000), available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/
document.cgi?file=/kron/archive2000/lO/27/debate.DTL (Segment 2).
149. Rep. Campbell's predictions seem especially unlikely given that most health
plans are not currently running at a profit. According to Carnegie Mellon economist Martin
Gaynor, "Profit margins of typical managed-care plans were below 1 percent in 1995 and
[have been] negative since then." Weinstein, supra note 68. Likewise, there is no support
for Dr. Robert Weinmann's suggestion that "doctors' unions could make the health-care
system more efficient by forcing HMOs to put more money into patient care and less into
executive compensation and other overhead costs." Robert L. Weinmann, Doctors' Unions,
DALLAS MORNING NEws, July 18, 1999, at 1J. Even if more money were transferred into
patient care, this would not mean that the system would automatically become more
"efficient." Indeed, HMOs developed in large part because unrestrained spending on patient
care was producing rapid increases in health care costs.
150. Cost Estimate, supra note 83.
151. See American Medical Association, Congressional Budget Office's Artful
Assumptions: Talking Points to Counter CBO's Cost Estimate of H.I 1304 (Mar. 16, 2000),
available at http://wwv.ama-assn.org/ama/basic/article/201-589-l.html.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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increased bargaining power to demand higher-quality patient care-and not to
insist upon higher salaries 154-health care comes with a cost. Managed care
evolved out of the need to control health care costs, and HMOs have developed
several methods-including reviews of service utilization-to achieve this
goal. While it is easy to forget that managed care has succeeded in
"dramatically curtailing health care cost increases that once threatened to
overwhelm both the public and private sectors," the impact of managed care on
cost containment should not be overlooked.1 55 H.R. 1304 now threatens to
reverse these gains and increase health care costs.
For understandable reasons (discussed in Part II above), doctors across the
country have become frustrated with the cost-control mechanisms of IMOs.
They believe that HMOs reduce the quality of care and impinge upon their
professional autonomy. While many of these complaints are legitimate, H.R.
1304's backers seek to turn back the clock without being explicit about the
trade-offs involved. In particular, providing doctors with bargaining power
over HMOs will increase health care costs. Even if the result were improved
patient care-and it is not clear that it would be 156-it is not obvious that
patients, or society as a whole, would be willing to make that bargain.' 5 7 At
the very least, we should be having this debate openly: Are improvements in
health care quality (or increased physicians' incomes) worth the associated
increased costs?
Or, instead of turning to the political arena, we could let the market decide.
Rep. Campbell has often stated that his legislation is "the best way to let the
market deal with the complaints so many health care professionals have raised
with HMOs. ' 158 In reality, however, his bill would distort the health care
market by giving physicians legally protected market power over health plans.
Antitrust law assumes that consumers do not need to be protected from a free
154. However, I agree with the CBO that it is likely that physicians would, in fact, use
their bargaining power to increase their fees. As discussed above, physician incomes-while
their rate of growth has slowed under managed care-are still fairly high, averaging around
$160,000. Dr. Fitzhugh Mullan notes one of the problems with collective action by doctors:
We may be frustrated as a profession but we are hardly disenfranchised. Our incomes
average a bit more than $160,000 a year. Pay and benefits are traditionally at the core of
what unions negotiate, and the specter of well-paid doctors banding together to protect their
presumed Lexus entitlement is not pretty.... Whatever the intentions of the current AMA
leadership, the possibility of doctors' unions as a vehicle to help the rich get richer is real-
and ugly.
Mullan, supra note 112, at B3.
155. Hearings, supra note 21, at 230 (statement of Bill Jones on behalf of the Antitrust
Coalition for Consumer Choice in Health Care).
156. See Part IV(B)(1), supra.
157. In a thoughtful analysis, William Sage writes, "I wonder if the intensity of the
medical profession's current focus on advocacy and adversarial process in coverage and
treatment matters represents a projection phenomenon in which physicians who feel
disempowered by managed care and long for fair process impute those feelings to patients."
Sage, supra note 111, at 1583.
158. Campbell, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
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market. 159 As long as active antitrust enforcement keeps either health plans or
physicians from establishing a position of market dominance, a free market
should respond to the needs of consumers. Indeed, the emergence of IPAs and
the consolidation of physician practices suggests that doctors are in the process
of establishing an effective counterweight to HMOs, even without government
intervention. Instead of permitting this free market process to evolve,
supporters of the Campbell Bill are attempting to direct the market to a
particular conclusion, without acknowledging the trade-offs involved.
V. CONCLUSION
Testifying before Congress, FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky concluded,
"There are no easy solutions to the problems inherent in the simultaneous
pursuit of cost effectiveness, high quality, and wider access to health care
services." 160  Indeed, Pitofsky's observation is an understatement. The
problems with HMOs that doctors have identified-in particular, the tendency
of some HMOs to deny or delay (or to pressure doctors to deny or delay)
needed care-are serious concerns that need to be addressed. 161 At the same
time, the United States spends more per capita on health care than any other
nation in the world, yet forty-four million Americans are uninsured and the
U.S. ranked an unimpressive thirty-seventh in a recent survey of national health
care systems.162 Thus, controlling health care costs and expanding access to
care should be national priorities.
H.R. 1304 is one attempt to address some of these issues. Frustrated with
the practices of HMOs, the bill's supporters believe that collective bargaining
by doctors could improve the quality of patient care and also halt the decline in
physicians' incomes. While these are certainly legitimate goals, the backers of
the Campbell Bill downplay or ignore the trade-offs that would be involved.
Though it is clear why they would prefer to overlook these issues, providing
doctors with collective bargaining powers will increase the overall cost of
health care and increase the number of people without any health care
coverage.
Even if improving the quality of care provided by HMOs were the only
goal of H.R. 1304, the bill's approach is deeply flawed. Using doctors as proxy
negotiators for patients is an unusual and uncertain way to improve patient
care. It is not guaranteed that doctors would always use their bargaining power
159. See notes 114-119 supra and accompanying text.
160. Hearings, supra note 21, at 56.
161. The traumas that can result from delays in needed care are highlighted by the
recent Supreme Court case of Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000). Plaintiff
Herdrich's doctor-who was contracting with Herdrich's HMO-noticed her inflamed
abdomen, but did not immediately order an ultrasound diagnostic procedure. Before any
ultrasound was performed, Herdrich's appendix burst, causing peritonitis.
162. Wealthiest, But Not Healthiest, BOSTON GLOBE, June 25, 2000, at E6.
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to negotiate in their patients'-as opposed to their own-best interests. Even if
they did, "[t]he collective judgment of health care professionals .concerning
what patients should want can differ markedly from what patients themselves
are asking for in the marketplace. ' 163 If quality of care is the real concern,
direct regulation of HMOs would appear to be a much more efficient and
uniform method of ensuring minimum standards of care.
Furthermore, doctors do not need additional bargaining power vis-A-vis
HMOs. As detailed above, very few managed care markets are dominated by
one or two large providers. Consequently, while it may put them under some
financial pressure, doctors generally have the ability to avoid working for
HMOs whose plans they dislike. Since H.R. 1304 would make no distinctions
between markets that are highly competitive and those where a few HMOs
dominate, the bill would give doctors in many areas undue leverage over
HMOs. Through collective bargaining power available to no other independent
contractors, doctors could restrict competition and raise prices in the health care
sector.
Finally, doctors already possess the ability to provide consumers with
alternatives to HMOs. As one antitrust enforcement agency official has noted,
"Provider networks that pass muster under the rule of reason can contract
directly with employers and other payers and thereby compete with health
plans that [doctors] believe offer... contractual terms that they consider unfair
or bad for patients." 164 Rather than enacting a risky plan with unknowable
consequences, we should encourage doctors to use the flexibility of the antitrust
laws to compete with HMOs on the basis of both price and cost.
If H.R. 1304 is not the solution, how should we pursue the ultimate goal of
"cost effectiveness, high quality, and wider access to health care services"? 165
The ultimate answer to this question must come from the political system. The
market alone-even a fully competitive market-is unlikely to generate health
care for all citizens or address our serious problems of uneven access to
adequate care. Nonetheless, any effective resolution of these issues will need a
competitive health care market as a foundation, and aggressive enforcement of
the antitrust laws helps to keep the health care sector dynamic. Therefore,
instead of burning holes in the fabric of our nation's antitrust laws-as H.R.
1304 threatens to do-we should enforce the antitrust laws aggressively.
163. Hearings, supra note 21, at 44 (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, FTC).
164. Robert Pitofsky, Thoughts on "Leveling the Playing Field" in Health Care
Markets: Remarks Before the National Health Lawyers Association Twentieth Annual
Program on Antitrust in the Health Care Field (Feb. 13, 1997), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/nhla.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2000).
165. Hearings, supra note 21, at 56 (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, FTC).
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